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 WOMENS’ EXPERIENCE IN LEGAL 




In these remarks, which I will confine to the personal and 
anecdotal level, I wish to examine what women students say is their 
experience of silencing in legal education. The remarks describe 
how this comes about and why the experience of being silenced is 
so troubling, not for just women but also for the law. I will also 
address how I, as a feminist law teacher, teach my classes — not 
just my classes in feminist theory but also those in labour law, torts 
or whatever else my Dean might persuade me to teach at some 
time.  
My interest in gender and legal education grew out of the 
experience of having numerous women students at Yale law school 
approach me to confide how they felt silenced by and alienated 
from their legal education. This was painful on two levels. First, I 
was hearing their profound expressions of pain, and, as a teacher, I 
was distressed that they were learning to dislike the law and fight 
the law, instead of becoming attracted to it. But it was also painful 
because it reminded me that I, too, had felt that my views were not 
always heard nor appreciated when I was a law student. I continue 
to feel this every day, as one of the token women on a law school 
faculty — and one foolish enough to identify myself publicly as a 
feminist, thus facing the risks of marginalization to which 
Catharine MacKinnon has referred. Women students tell me that 
their classroom comments get swallowed up by what seems to them 
like a “black hole”; they are completely ignored. These reactions 
make them feel that they must have said something very stupid — 
until, five minutes later, a male makes the same comment and 
suddenly the professor’s reaction is, “what a brilliant remark,” and 
the point becomes the focus of discussion for the next ten minutes. 
I knew exactly what they were talking about because this had 
happened to me as a student; it still happens to me when I try to 
speak at a faculty meeting or workshop.  
But there is another aspect of the women students’ silence 
which raises questions about the nature of law and demonstrates 
how fundamental is the feminist challenge to law and legal 
education. This aspect is also raised by comments women students 
make to me. They feel resistant to, and often profoundly angered by 
or alienated from, what they are learning, because gender is always 
being ignored. Women notice when the gender implications of a 
legal issue or doctrine are being ignored. Sometimes this noticing, 
especially with confused, frightened or intimidated first year law 
students, takes the form of a woman feeling, based on her life 
experience, that there is a gender issue here. She wonders if she 
should mention it, thinking perhaps she is wrong because the 
professor who is supposed to know so much has not mentioned it. 
Occasionally, one of these women students finally becomes bold 
enough or angry enough to raise her hand, and her comment is met 
with the professor saying something like, “well, could you rephrase 
that like a lawyer please”, or “next”, or “I fail to see the relevance 
of that.” This sort of professorial reaction — dismissing the 
student’s point of view — reinforces men students’ pervasive 
blindness to gender, or reinforces their sense that gender issues are 
trivial and unimportant. For the women, it reinforces the vague 
doubts they had that their life experiences or their perspectives are 
not integral to the law after all.  
Let me give some concrete examples of this kind of reaction by 
women to gender issues being ignored, and the silencing and 
alienation that can result. I have had many women students come to 
me (so many that I can no longer count the number on both hands) 
and say something like, “I turned off from law school when Roe v 
Wade,1 about the constitutionality of state regulation of abortion, 
was being discussed in class as if it were solely a matter of the 
appropriate boundaries between the authority of courts and 
legislatures.” These frustrated women students would be sitting 
there, often for two or three days, while the case was being 
discussed in this abstract doctrinal fashion. It seemed to them that 
the professor did not even dare mention abortion, much less that 
abortion is something that is important to women’s status in society 
because they are subject to societal control over their bodies and 
reproduction.  
The constitutional law professor would discuss this loaded issue 
of abortion or the criminal law professor would discuss rape or 
battering as if it had never occurred to him that in this group of 
students there were some who may have experienced abortion, or 
rape; or that some of them, even if they have not yet experienced it, 
know that they may have to face it at some point in their life. For 
no woman can abortion be simply a matter of the appropriate 
division of authority between courts and legislatures. When women 
students sit in such a law class and hear it treated as if that is the 
only issue, it produces one of two reactions. For some it produces a 
reaction bordering on rage and fury, either at the professor or the 
law, that the law — or the professor — could completely ignore 
women and act as if issues of governmental structure were more 
important. For others it creates a sense of frustration and 
puzzlement — a sense that maybe there is something wrong with 
them, because they think this issue is there but the professor acts as 
if it does not arise. Often, either of these two reactions causes 
women to turn from the law. And, the failure to discuss the gender 
implications means the men students never have to grapple with the 
fact that abortion is a gender issue, and not just a matter of the 
appropriate division of authority between courts and legislatures.  
There are many other examples of women noticing gender 
issues and the professor not, some in much less loaded contexts. 
For example, some students told me about their frustration with the 
decision of the United States Supreme Court in Gilmore v Utah,2 in 
which the Court held that the mother of convicted murderer Gary 
Gilmore had no standing to intervene in the sentencing hearing, 
because she was an uninterested, unaffected outsider. Another 
student once came to me and said, “I was in contracts class today 
and we were reading a case from 1860 where the woman had done 
something but the husband was the party suing. 1 felt like it was a 
stupid question to ask, but since the woman was really the party 
involved, why was the husband suing? I was afraid that if I asked 
this question the professor would have told me it was a stupid 
question.” So she came to me to ask the question. I gave her an 
explanation of the old laws that meant that, once women were 
married, they became in the eyes of the law non-persons and were 
disabled from suing on their own behalf. A light bulb went on for 
the student. She said, “that changes the old case; that is really 
central to the case. How could the professor not have mentioned 
that?” I gave her a pep talk and encouraged her to raise her hand in 
class the next day to share this enlightenment with the rest of the 
class. And, of course, much as she had feared, the professor’s 
comment was, “I utterly fail to see the relevance of that. Contract 
law is contract law. The gender of the parties, who can make the 
contract and who can sue on the contract are completely irrelevant 
to the formulation of the doctrinal rules of contract.” Not only was 
this erroneous historically, but, as I subsequently learned, it was a 
long time before that student ever felt comfortable speaking in class 
again. From that day on she decided that she disliked and distrusted 
the law of contract. The class lost the important perspective of her 
voice, and she lost some respect for the law and had to spend a lot 
of the rest of her first year in law school struggling with the law 
instead of learning.  
These incidents suggest that sometimes the kinds of comments 
that women might want to offer, because they think the comments 
should be profoundly relevant to the law, may be silenced in legal 
education. Professors think they are legally irrelevant and 
additionally they tread into the scary, forbidden realm of emotion. 
Consider the woman who has had an abortion who becomes angry 
when abortion is discussed in class as about something other than 
women’s lives, and who finally becomes angry enough to say, 
“wait a minute!” Often what happens is that once women decide to 
speak, the comments do sound like emotional outbursts. But one of 
the central insights of feminist theory is to challenge directly the 
reason/emotion dichotomy by asking why it is that whatever 
ignores gender is considered “neutral reason”, and why it is that 
insisting gender not be ignored, is so often labelled as “emotion” — 
and thus irrelevant to law? I think my answer to that question is 
quite obvious — our understandings of the categories “reason” and 
“emotion”, and “legal relevance” are affected by the fact that for 
centuries men have shaped and defined what counts as theory, as 
reason and as law.  
I will now elaborate what I try to do when I teach to overcome 
the pervasive treatment of gender as irrelevant and to respond to 
women’s complaints of silencing and alienation. I think what 
distinguishes my teaching, perhaps first and foremost, from that of 
many of my colleagues is that gender and power are never ignored 
regardless of the subject. I discuss how a legal doctrine may be 
based more on the experiences of one gender group rather than the 
other — the reasonable man standard in torts, for example. I also 
discuss how a legal doctrine may have different impacts on, and 
consequences for, people of different genders — such as the 
linkage between tort damages and lost wages. I wish to add a 
caveat to comments earlier this morning that we teachers make our 
perspectives known from the outset in the classroom, and pick up 
on Catharine’s reference to the risks for women in doing this. I 
must say that the one time I decided I would be open with the 
students and announce publicly at the beginning of semester that I 
was a feminist and would develop a feminist perspective on torts, 
was the one time I had a rather rebellious group of male students in 
the class who kept groaning that they did not see what women’s 
lives had to do with them at all. Fortunately, the women students 
were emboldened enough by me to answer those objections for me 
so that I never had to say anything. I have found that if you wish to 
discuss gender issues in mainstream doctrinal courses, it is better 
simply to do so, treating them as they are — an important part of 
real tort law.  
Neither do I ignore the experience of peoples’ lives. I treat 
experience as fundamentally relevant to the law and often use that 
experience to test, critique and challenge the law. Consider labour 
law, for example. My class in employment law begins by 
discussing our experiences with employment. Chances are, if there 
are women in the class, and there always are, we quickly move, 
from their experiences at work, into discussing gender dynamics of 
the work place, including gendered notions of work and the value 
of work. That raises important questions about what labour law 
regulates and what aspects of human work it leaves invisible. Once 
students’ experiences of work are raised, a wonderful basis is 
offered against which to test and critique the legal doctrine which 
sees work primarily as a contractual exchange. The use of their 
own experiences engages the students in the law in a way that 
offering various theories and doctrinal approaches does not. But it 
also signals to the students, black, white, Hispanic and female, that 
the experience of each of them and every one else is profoundly 
relevant. It also provides a wonderful occasion for asking why 
some peoples’ experiences are much more reflected in the law than 
others. The students’ experiences are used as the lens for examining 
the ways in which certain aspects of human experience, often the 
male ones — such as work being separate from family demands — 
are much more embraced by and reflected in the law. In tort law, 
for example, that enables me to raise questions such as, who is this 
fictional reasonable person? What is his gender? Why are things 
that seem so ordinary and commonplace to women so often 
branded as the reactions of unreasonable people in tort law? I use 
women’s experiences — the labelling of what they do from nine to 
five being labelled work, and what they do from five p.m. to nine 
o’clock the next morning not work — both as a way of critiquing 
the measure of damages in tort law, which privileges work activity 
over other kinds of fundamental human activity, and also as a way 
of critiquing the law of employment as being fundamentally 
gendered in its definition of work.  
So, I teach law as Catharine MacKinnon has mentioned, as a 
fundamentally gendered subject, as something that has been 
defined by and shaped by men. I examine the consequences of this 
for the people — white, black, Hispanic and female — who 
historically in the United States were excluded from participating in 
shaping it. This latter remark should suggest to you that feminism 
is not just about women. I think it is about using the experiences of 
women to help us see the various forms of oppression. It is useful 
for seeing new possibilities for, or needs for, changing the law to 
make it less oppressive and more a positive tool for overcoming the 
many forms of oppression and disempowerment that exist. 
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